


The Richmond Times-Dispatch
By Staff Reports
Published: February 5, 2009
A bill to ban smoking in Virginia’s bars and restaurants cleared the House of Delegates General Laws Committee this evening by a 16-6 vote.
The bill will now go to the full House.
The committee action came on the same day that Republican House Speaker William J. Howell and Democratic Gov. Timothy M. Kaine reached agreement on the proposed legislation.
Flanked by a bipartisan group of lawmakers, Howell and Kaine discussed the legislation that would make exceptions for private clubs and restaurants with a designated smoking room that is physically separated and independently ventilated from non-smoking dining areas.
The bill would also exclude any permanent outdoor patio area of a restaurant, any portion of a restaurant used just for private functions and street-side mobile food stands.
Howell and Kaine cooperated to forge the agreement.
But legislators said the compromise did not include any guaranteed passage by the House, which has been hostile to anti-smoking bills. The bill will be carried by a Republican in the House and a Democrat in the Senate.
“The compromise strikes a fair balance between the rights of smokers who choose to enjoy a legal product and the rights of other individuals who want to enjoy a smoke-free environment when eating at a restaurant,“ Howell said this morning in a news conference.
Keenan Caldwell, director of government relations for the American Cancer Society of Virginia, said health groups had no role in crafting the proposed compromise. He said the groups were still reviewing the proposal.
“Our hope has always been something that protects the health of workers,“ Caldwell said. “At first glance, as you look at (the compromise), it doesn’t do that, and it is not really in the interest of public health, so that is a major concern of ours.“
But Sara Long, director of program services for the March of Dimes, said she was encouraged to see the state “taking baby steps to help the babies.“
David Sutton, a spokesman for cigarette maker Philip Morris USA, expressed skepticism.
“While this bill attempts to provide a compromse, we believe that some of the provisions go too far,“ he said. “It would impose significant costs in a very difficult economy on business owners that would like to accommodate smokers in their establishments.“
And some conservative grass-roots organizations were not happy with the deal.
Ben Marchi, with Americans for Prosperity, said about Howell, “The activists he will depend on this fall, many of whom are members of groups like ours, will not be pleased that he has caved to the advocates of big government, namely the governor.
“We feel it is unfortunate that the speaker has chosen to trust government to solve our problems rather than to trust consumers with the decision.“
If passed, the bill would make Virginia part of a growing list of states passing legislation to curb smoking in restaurants. Twenty-three other states, including Maryland, have passed bans on smoking indoors at bars and restaurants, as have the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
In Virginia, smoking was banned in all state buildings and vehicles under an executive order signed in 2006 by Kaine.
State legislators, in both chambers and on both sides of the aisle, proposed 14 smoking ban bills this year, according to Kaine’s office. In addition to that high interest, Howell said he thinks a compromise was forged this year because “both sides were willing to yield.“
The Senate backed total bans, including private clubs, Howell said, and the House was unwilling to adopt such a broad prohibition.
“You’re gonna tell a guy that fought at the Battle of the Bulge that he can’t have a cigarette with his coffee at the VFW club,“ Howell said. “You can’t do things like that.“
Under the legislation, violators would be subject to a fine of no more than $25.
The agreement follows the rejection earlier this week by legislators of a key component of Kaine’s budget-cutting plan involving tobacco—a 30 cent per pack hike in the tax on cigarettes. Kaine had hoped to raise $147 million with the tax, which he said would help prevent further cuts in Medicaid and offesty the $400 million or so it costs the state to treat smoking related illnesses under the program.
Second-hand smoke is responsible for an estimated 1,700 deaths per year, according to the Virginia Department of Health. In addition, the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids estimates the Commonwealth spends $113 million a year on health care expenditures related to exposure to second-hand smoke.
How the bill will fare on the floor of the full House is uncertain.
“I’m never confident down here,“ Howell said. “I’m surprised very day.“
—Olympia Meola, Jim Nolan and Tyler Whitley,
In 1999 (I think), the New York Times ran a story questioning the wisdom of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in bending to President Clinton's pressure to guarantee loans made to sub prime borrowers (i.e., those whose credit ratings and or incomes did not qualify them for conventional loans) to expand the numbers of people who could own their own homes. Though these agencies are supposedly independent of political pressure, that is a myth; especially when the President appoints those who serve as agency heads. Congress had to know about the risk when these agencies began guaranteeing these sub prime loans, but did not step in to halt the action. Now, we taxpayers are going to get stuck not only with the costs of saving the banks, but now the auto makers and the unions are standing in line with their hands out for federal money.
The following appeared in WashingtonPost.com on the date indicated. It merits your attention. It is time to take control of our own future.
By Zachary A. Goldfarb
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, December 9, 2008; 1:02 PM
Internal Freddie Mac documents show that senior executives at the company were warned years ago that they were offering mortgages that could pose dangers to the firm, hurt borrowers and generate more risky loans throughout the industry.
At Fannie Mae, top executives were told it was necessary to develop "underground" efforts to buy subprime mortgages because of competitive pressures, although there were growing risks and borrowers often didn't understand the terms of the loans, documents show.
The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which has the documents, is holding a hearing now to discuss Fannie and Freddie's downfall. The companies were seized by the government three months ago after nearly collapsing in the wake of billions of dollars of losses on mortgages.
In a memo to former Freddie chief executive Richard Syron and other top executives, former Freddie chief enterprise risk officer David Andrukonis wrote that the company was buying mortgages that appear "to target borrowers who would have trouble qualifying for a mortgage if their financial position were adequately disclosed."
Andrukonis warned that these mortgages could be particularly harmful for Hispanic borrowers, and they could lead to loans being made to people who would be unlikely to pay them off. "The potential for the perception and the reality of predatory lending with this product is great," Andrukonis wrote.
The documents, which were released by the committee today, show that Fannie and Freddie, two linchpins of the nation's mortgage market, continued to push into new, risky markets despite internal debate over whether the efforts were prudent.
Fannie and Freddie declined to comment yesterday, as did Andrukonis. In testimony today before the House oversight committee, Syron acknowledged he was warned about risky loans but said that executives thought they had made the right decision, balancing profit motives, public policy goals and safety concerns.
At the same hearing, Daniel Mudd, Fannie's chief executive from 2005 to 2008, said that, if hindsight were 20/20 he would redo the way Fannie underwrote mortgage loans.
Mudd, Syron and two other former Fannie and Freddie executives were sharply criticized by lawmakers today. Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), the committee's ranking member, said they needed to take responsibility.
"All four of you still seem to be in complete denial that Fannie and Freddie are in any way responsible for this," Issa said. "Your testimony says your not accepting any blame for this at all. You're telling us that in fact that everyone was doing it."
When the government took over the mortgage finance giants, it announced it was installing new management and creating a $200 billion fund to support the companies in case they faltered further.
Fannie and Freddie's distress has its roots in the new, risky mortgages the companies bought and guaranteed in increasing numbers, largely from 2004 through 2007. These new products included home loans made to people with blemished credit histories, called subprime loans, and mortgages made without verification of income, assets or employment, often called Alt-A
As Mudd's and Syron's decisions have been called into question, they have described their push into these new areas of the mortgage business as an inevitable consequence of dueling mandates to support affordable housing and maximize profit for shareholders. And they've said that the collapse of the housing market was unforeseeable and the primary reason behind the company's fall.
But the documents show how top executives at both companies were told that the new subprime and Alt-A loans were dangerous both to the companies and to the borrowers they were charted by Congress to help.
At Fannie, chief credit officer Adolfo Marzol wrote to chief executive Mudd in March 2005 to warn that entering new areas of the mortgage market represented significant risks. The industry was pushing new types of loans, he wrote, including those that required little documentation and those that carried rates that would adjust in a few years.
"The combination of these risks may be difficult for subprime borrowers to understand," Marzol wrote.
Marzol also warned that securities backed by these loans might not be as safe as they seemed. Fannie reported them as carrying the top grade given by credit-rating agencies, AAA, but Marzol cast doubt on that. "Although we invest almost exclusively in AAA rated securities, there is concern that rating agencies may not be properly assessing the risk in these securities," he wrote.
Despite these concerns, Fannie continued to push into this new market. A business presentation in 2005 expressed concern that unless it didn't, Fannie could be relegated to a "niche" player in the industry. Mudd later reported in a presentation that Fannie moved into this market "to maintain relevance" with big customers who wanted to do more business with Fannie, including Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, IndyMac and Washington Mutual.
The documents suggest than Fannie and Freddie knew they were playing a role in shaping the market for some types of risky mortgages. An e-mail to Mudd in September 2007 from a top deputy reported that banks were modeling their subprime mortgages to what Fannie was buying.
At Freddie, risk officer Andrukonis expressed concern about a new mortgage product called stated-income, stated-asset that the company was considering buying. The loans required borrowers to state their incomes and assets, but not prove them.
In a memo to Syron and others, Andrukonis warned that in 1990 Freddie called this product "dangerous" and stopped offering it. "I'm not convinced we aren't leading the market into this product," Andrukonis wrote.
Freddie offered to buy the stated-income, stated-asset loans anyway.
Andrukonis and others expressed concern about another type of mortgage Freddie was buying, where neither income nor assets were stated on the loan application. Andrukonis said these were popular with Hispanic borrowers, but the delinquency rates of 8 to 13 percent were much higher than on conventional loans. People familiar with the matter said Freddie was being pushed by advocacy groups to come up with new loan products to offer to low-income and minority borrowers.
Andrukonis acknowledged that getting out of this business could cost $50 million annually and draw criticism. "On the other hand, what better way to highlight our sense of mission than to walk away from profitable business because it hurts the borrowers we are trying to serve," he wrote.
At times, Andrukonis grew frustrated with the response he got from Freddie leadership about his concerns as he registered worries about low-documentation loans.
In a message to colleagues, Andrukonis wrote that while he and others "make the case for sound credit, it's not the theme coming from the top of the company and inevitably people down the line will play follow the leader."
Andrukonis was joined by others expressing concerns. Don Bisenius, then a credit officer, wrote in an e-mail to Michael May, a top executive, that "the lack of verified information on a borrower's income and assets could clearly influence the risk potential in a loan and the ultimate performance of the loans."
In a separate e-mail, May wrote that he recognized the risks of the business. But he predicted "a different pattern [than] we did with no-doc lending before," suggesting there won't be big losses. He listed reasons including that Freddie had more information about borrowers' credit-worthiness than before and other tools for accessing risk.
In October 2004, May ultimately recommended continuing no-income, no-asset loans, though with some changes. Through Freddie Mac, May declined to comment. Syron signed off on continuing with the loans. Bisenius, now part of new Freddie chief executive David Moffett's inner circle, formally opposed the decision.
There is some mystery surrounding Andrukonis's ultimate role. In one document sent to Syron, he joined a group of people neither supportive of nor opposing the decision to continue no-income, no-asset loans, but registered as "neutral."
However, a person familiar with the discussions said Andrukonis and other risk officers continued to oppose the product until the very end. Freddie executives asked him to leave the company, according to people familiar with the matter, which he did in 2005.
Staff writer Amit R. Paley contributed to this report.
Everyone overeats in November (Thanksgiving) and December (Christmas party season). It just CAN'T be avoided by 'most everybody. I watch my waistline by eating at the Mekong Restaurant. Lots of vegetables in their dishes, little (or none) fatty oils used in the preparation, and most dishes consist of healthier (and lower calorie) "meats" such chicken, pork, and seafood. This place has long been a favortie for lovers of authentic Vietnamese cooking. The food is satisfying to the palate, filling to stomach, and easy on the pocketbook. Check it out at www.Mekong-Restaurant.com.
Recently, the following information was posted on WalletPop.com, courtesy of financial planners Ken and Daria Dolan. The scam-sharks are in the water in greater numbers now, thanks to the Internet. You should be aware of this timely information.
Financial Crisis Phishing Scams
According to the Federal Trade Commission, there is a new round of e-mail scams out there that are tied to the financial crisis. Many of these e-mails "phish" for personal information -- your Social Security number, account numbers, passwords, etc. The scammer then uses that info to steal your identity. Proceed with extreme caution if you get an e-mail that purports to be from your mortgage company, a government agency, or other official institution. If the e-mail is requesting ANY personal information, you know it's a scam. No government or reputable financial institution will ask you to share confidential information in an e-mail.
Banking Crisis Scams
The banking crisis is presenting scammers with another golden opportunity. We're hearing numerous complaints about official-looking e-mails that claim to be from a bank or from the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). These e-mails prey on your fears, claiming your bank is in trouble or that money has been stolen from your account. Most ask for your personal information, which they then use to steal your identity or illegally access your account. If you receive an e-mail from your bank requesting any personal information, contact your bank immediately and do not respond to the e-mail.
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