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"Presumed Innocent" -- Not a Unique American Concept

Ecce Homo!

The New Testament of the Bible tells us these are words Pilate spoke to those wanting Jesus crucified while He stood beaten and bloody in Pilate's presence, and before those seeking his death. It translates, "behold the man," and was perhaps a not so subtle message ("Isn't this punishment enough?") to those demanding more than just a severe beating, but seeking capital punishment. But was this magninimity on Pilate's part, or a request impelled by a guilty conscience? As ruthless as the Roman Legions were in battle, and diabolical and cruel in political fights between themselves, there was an undercurrent of justice in the Roman esse.

In an 1895 United States Supreme Court opinion, Coffin v. United States, our highest court chronicled the origins of the concepts of "presumption of innnocence" and "proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." In part the Court said, "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." The Coffin decision did not leave the matter there, but expounded upon the roots of the principle.

In an historical context, it was said there that the concept of the presumption of innocence could be traced to its earliest mention in the Old Testament, predating by several hundred years the life of Pilate. Even before the Romans, writings of the Spartans and Athenians evidence its adoption by the Hellenic peoples. But it is the Romans who have left us the greater evidence of its application in their society. As Mr. Justice White noted in Coffin:

"Ammianus Marcellinus relates an anecdote of the Emperor Julian which illustrates the enforcement of this principle in the Roman law. Numerius, the governor of Narbonensis [a Roman province on the border between Italy and France], was on trial before the emperor, and, contrary to the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public. Numerius contented himself with denying his guilt, and there was not sufficient proof against him.

His adversary, Delphidius, ‘a passionate man,’ seeing that the failure of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and exclaimed, ‘Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of the guilty?’ to which Julian replied, ‘If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?’ Rerum Gestarum, lib. 18, c. 1."

Thereafter, the Romans spread the concept among the territories it occupied, including England. There are many references in the Common Law treatises going back to the early 19th century, but the most well-known appears in Blackstone's Commentaries on the common law: "Tthe law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 2 Bl. Comm. c. 27, marg. p. 358, ad finem.

Our English forebears did not abandon the principle, but clung to it in the administration of the law in Virginia and in other colonies, and in our state and federal systems thereafter. But how does it work?

The example cited above, relating to Numerius and Delphidius, is a good one because it encompasses all the elements. The accused, Numerius, had only to deny the charge against him, and the burden fell to his accuser, Delphidius, to produce evidence (i.e., facts) to prove Numerius guilty of the charge.